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Abstract. We explore the property of equivocation tolerance for Conflict-
Free Replicated Data Types (CRDTs). We show that a subclass of CRDTs
is equivocation-tolerant and can thereby cope with any number of Byzan-
tine faults: Without equivocation detection, prevention or remediation,
they still fulfill strong eventual consistency (SEC). We also conjecture
that there is only one operation-based CRDT design supporting non-
commutative operations that fulfills SEC in Byzantine environments with
any number of faults.
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1 Introduction
As the name suggests, Conflict-free Replicated Data Types (CRDTs) provide
powerful properties: in particular, updates can be applied without further coor-
dination of replicas, and recovery from network partitions can be done with ease.
While crash-fault environments are typically assumed for CRDTs, it is natural
to investigate whether or under which conditions these desired CRDT properties
also hold in Byzantine environments.
Recent works on CRDTs in Byzantine environments have followed different
paths. The work stretches from classical assumptions of an honest two-thirds ma-
jority [7] introducing coordination (e.g., Byzantine-tolerant causal-order broad-
cast [1]) to coordination-free, sybil-resistant CRDTs using broadcast based on
the happened-before relation as directed, acyclic graphs [5, 4].
In this brief announcement, we relate the notion of equivocation to CRDTs
and show under which conditions a subclass of CRDTs is equivocation-tolerant in
Byzantine environments. We show that, due to equivocation tolerance, all state-
based and certain operation-based CRDTs tolerate any number of Byzantine
faults while depending on rather mild assumptions on the communication layer.
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Equivocation is the act of a Byzantine replica sending different updates, which
appear valid on their own, to different recipients where it should have sent the
same update [2]. While equivocation can only be detected globally or with two
equivocated updates, a valid update is an update that is protocol-conforming
when viewed on its own. Omission occurs if a crash- or Byzantine-faulty replica
sends an update to only a strict subset of all protocol-intended recipients.
A system provides Non-Equivocation if it prevents Byzantine replicas from
performing Equivocation. We say that an algorithm is equivocation-tolerant if it
neither needs to detect, prevent, nor remedy equivocation to ensure its provided
guarantees beyond what is needed to cope with omission. It follows that correct
replicas need to be able to locally detect an invalid update.
2 CRDTs and Equivocation Tolerance
CRDTs provide Strong Eventual Consistency (SEC), consisting of Strong Con-
vergence (“correct replicas that have delivered the same updates have an equiv-
alent state”), Eventual Delivery (“an update delivered at some correct replica
is eventually delivered to all correct replicas”), and Termination (“All method
executions terminate”) [6]. Equivocation mainly threatens Strong Convergence:
either the notion of which updates are the same, or the application order of up-
dates can be equivocated. Intuitively, equivocation tolerance for CRDTs means
that validity of updates is defined in a way that any two valid updates are conflict-
free, which allows applying any valid update directly, without threatening Strong
Convergence. As uncoordinated update application is then sufficient, threats to
Termination like coordinated equivocation detection and remediation can be
avoided. We argue that CRDTs are equivocation-tolerant if they remain conflict
free when facing any number of byzantine faults. With equivocation tolerance,
only omission faults remain, threatening Eventual Delivery.
Below, we show that all state-based CRDTs and a subclass of operation-
based CRDTs are equivocation-tolerant. Consequently, an arbitrary number of
Byzantine replicas cannot harm SEC. We assume authenticated channels be-
tween a static group of replicas participating in the CRDT, and that all correct
replicas form a connected component in the communication graph.
2.1 State-based CRDTs and Equivocation Tolerance
Theorem 1. All state-based CRDTs provide equivocation tolerance.
Proof. State-based CRDTs are based on defining a join-semilattice made of all
valid states. They only send their current state without metadata, which means
that an update is valid if and only if it is part of the semilattice, which is locally
verifiable. Due to the commutativity of the join relation and the partial order
of the semilattice, any two valid updates cannot conflict with each other, as
both can be merged in an arbitrary order with the same result. An equivocation
consisting of d differing updates can thereby be treated as d independent updates
for which omission has occurred. ut
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Lemma 1. State-based CRDTs ensure Strong Eventual Consistency for all cor-
rect replicas in an environment with n replicas of which an arbitrary number f
exhibit Byzantine faults, i.e., have fault tolerance n > f .
Proof. Due to Theorem 1, we can treat equivocation as omission, and are left to
ensure Eventual Delivery. State-based CRDTs gossip their current state regularly
and unsolicitedly to all other replicas. As their current state indirectly contains
all updates they have received and merged before, updates not sent directly to a
specific replica will eventually reach that replica indirectly via correct replicas.
ut
2.2 Operation-based CRDTs and Equivocation Tolerance
While state-based CRDTs need few assumptions to work in Byzantine environ-
ments with any number of faults, only a subset of operation-based CRDTs can
do so, and yet they need a number of additional assumptions. Specifically, for
equivocation tolerance, all potentially conflicting operations have to be locally
detected as invalid. To avoid inconsistencies due to equivocation, we require that
valid operations have an inherent identity : Any two operations that are the same
as defined by the protocol need to lead to the same outcome when applied. In-
herent identity can be ensured by deriving the identity of an operation from its
content, either by comparing the full content, or by verifiable unique identifiers
gained via content addressing: the identifier of an operation is the hash of its
content. Thereby, identical operations are not applied twice when received twice.
Operation-based CRDTs require that non-commutative operations are ap-
plied in causal order. To avoid inconsistencies due to equivocation on operation
ordering, we also require that valid operations have an inherent ordering : Either
all operations are commutative and no ordering is needed, or the datatype se-
mantics inherently records a happened-before relation, i.e., the potential causal
order in the datatype payload. If done via content addressing, Byzantine attack-
ers cannot tamper with the happened-before relation, as hashes verifiably prove
that an operation referenced by another operation via its hash has happened
before the other operation.
Theorem 2. Operation-based CRDTs that provide inherent identity and inher-
ent ordering of operations are equivocation-tolerant.
Proof. Without the above requirements, operations of operation-based CRDTs
contain metadata that can introduce conflicts, e.g., a non-unique operation iden-
tifier or wrong happened-before relation. Inherent identity and inherent ordering
prevent those conflicts and thereby ensure that equivocations can be treated as
omissions. However, inherent identity and ordering must be locally verifiable,
which is the case for all explained mechanisms. An equivocation that breaks
SEC and leads to a permanent inconsistent state must either break inherent
identity or inherent order, breaking an assumption of their mechanisms: if en-
sured by hashing, the equivocation can be reduced to a hash collision. ut
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Without periodic gossiping of state-based CRDTs, operation-based CRDTs
need to be able to handle omissions to ensure Eventual Delivery. Omission Han-
dling can rely on a payload-recorded happened-before relation to detect missing
elements in the causal order. Using content addressing, those missing elements
can be re-requested verifiably from other replicas. Alternatively, CRDTs can pe-
riodically gossip the set of all received operations. The gossiping approach can
be formalized and made more efficient through the happened-before relation and
hash chaining [5]. We note that this approach essentially uses a state-based set
CRDT to synchronize all operations, benefiting from the Byzantine tolerance of
all state-based CRDTs shown in Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. Omission-handling, equivocation-tolerant operation-based CRDTs en-
sure Strong Eventual Consistency for all correct replicas in an environment with
n replicas of which an arbitrary number f exhibit Byzantine faults, i.e., have
fault tolerance n > f .
Proof. Due to Theorem 2, we can treat equivocation as omission. Using one of
the explained omission handling mechanisms, equivocation-tolerant operation-
based CRDTs can ensure that omitted operations are eventually delivered. ut
3 Discussion and Conclusion
We showed that some CRDTs can be used in Byzantine environments with an
arbitrary number of faults by leveraging their equivocation tolerance. We now
discuss how these CRDTs can be brought into practice.
In classical CRDT use cases, all parties have full permissions to perform any
CRDT update, including the deletion of current states. Thus, deleting is not a
Byzantine act. Therefore, when dealing with CRDTs in Byzantine environments,
the focus is typically on grow-only CRDTs.
In environments with byzantine majorities, a CRDT with non-commutative
operations has to record the happened-before relation in the payload to ensure
the causal order independently of the broadcast order. The only way known to
us to ensure the causal order in a locally verifiable, Byzantine-tolerant way is to
use hash chaining. The happened-before relation being a partial order inherently
leads to a directed, acyclic graph of all operations. To efficiently ensure Eventual
Delivery, it is natural to employ the happened-before relationship recorded in
the graph by re-requesting missing parent operations and only gossiping childless
operations. This line of thought leads us to the following conjecture:
Conjecture. A hash-chained directed acyclic graph as described in [5, 4] is the
only operation-based CRDT with non-commutative operations that provides
SEC for any number of Byzantine faults, i.e., has fault tolerance n > f .
State-based CRDTs are easy to deploy in Byzantine environments, as shown
in Lemma 1, based on their unconditional equivocation tolerance. However, the
identity of updates gets lost since only states are propagated in the system. It is
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not possible to reconstruct the update that led to a new state, which makes it
impossible to prove which replica performed which CRDT updates and whether
it was allowed to do so. Hence, access control on the different access and update
methods of state-based CRDTs, giving different permissions to different partici-
pating replicas, is impossible to enforce. This makes state-based CRDTs suitable
for decentralized systems like the Newsgroup system where any user can write
new articles and reply to old ones. The current Newsgroup system is susceptible
to equivocation, as users are trusted to not assign the same identifier to different
articles. If based on an equivocation-tolerant CRDT, SEC could be guaranteed.
In contrast to state-based CRDTs, as shown in Lemma 2, operation-based
CRDTs require additional properties to provide SEC in Byzantine environments.
However, with operation-based CRDTs, the original caller of an update method
can be determined and verified with authentication mechanisms like digital sig-
natures. Therefore, operation-based CRDTs provide the necessary prerequisites
for access control, which makes them easier to deploy in systems like instant mes-
saging. In summary, state-based grow-only CRDTs can play out their strengths
in public, permissionless Byzantine systems, while operations-based CRDTs have
more restrictions, but allow for permissions with finer granularity of replicas.
In other fields, equivocation is handled not by tolerance but by prevention.
In Byzantine fault-tolerant agreement protocols, non-equivocation can be ful-
filled by preventing Byzantine processes from creating two valid messages with
the same identifier when identifiers are created using monotonic counters that
are located inside trusted hardware components [3]. In distributed ledger tech-
nologies like blockchains, equivocation usually means creating a fork. While it is
possible to mine two blocks that have the same hash value, the probability that
the resulting branches co-exist is very low due to probabilistic leader election
mechanisms like proof of work.
In this brief announcement, we analyzed the reasons why and under which
circumstances a subclass of CRDTs can be moved from the crash fault model to
a Byzantine fault model using the notion of equivocation. We showed that even
when faced with an arbitrary number of Byzantine faults, this subclass can keep
the characteristic traits of CRDTs, like efficiency, low coordination effort, and
Strong Eventual Consistency.
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